On Emotions (a conference report)

In this post our PhD student Isaura Peddis reports from the second annual conference of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions (EPSSE).

The EPSSE is a young not-for-profit organisation, which was born to satisfy the demand for a deeper understanding in the subject of emotions and give a chance to those who, like me, are interested in this subject to connect together and share ideas.

The society hosted its second annual conference at the University of Edinburgh between the 14 and 17 July. 97 speakers from all around the globe participated in the conference and presented several topics and perspectives connected to the study of emotions; for example, aesthetic philosophy, theoretical philosophy, moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of mind and ancient philosophy.

I had the pleasure to attend the conference as a member of the audience and as a speaker. The number of speakers and the quality of their work, made it difficult for me to choose what talks to attend. Among all the talks available the ones that I most enjoyed, due to the nature of the topic, were those by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (“The challenge of forgiveness: Shallow and Deep, Moral and Non-Moral”), Laura Candiotto ("Aporetic State: The Shameful Recognition of Contradictions in the Socratic Elenchus") and Christina Werner ("How can we be moved by the Fate of an Abstract Artefact? Created Non-spatial Entities as Intentional Objects of Fictional Emotions").

I presented my paper, "Aristotle and his Archetypal Classical Cognitive Theory of Emotions: a Philosophical Myth", during the second day of the conference. It was a big surprise for me to discover that my paper was selected to be presented during the section dedicated to ancient philosophy. When it comes to ancient philosophy, I consider myself to be an amateur who has a soft spot for the ancient Greek philosophy; therefore it was an honour to have the opportunity to share my ideas with those who not only share my passion but also are competent in the topic. In my paper, I argue that Aristotle cannot be considered a cognitivist; my assertion is based on the analysis of passages where Aristotle sketches out the passions and those where he outlines the sensitive faculty and determines that, inside his philosophy, the body, together with the cognition, has a role in the arousal of emotions.

The annual conference is not the only occasion where the members meet. In order to encourage the interaction between its members, the EPSSE, runs workshop all year round. The two upcoming for the next year are “Love and Time” that will take place in Israel in March 2015 and “The meaning of Moods” that will be held in Basel in December 2015. 

Athens is the city chosen for the third annual conference in 2016, therefore, Aristotle, wait for me at the Lyceum and I will share with you my ideas!

Was Aristotle a Cognitivist about the Emotions?

Logo of the EPSSE

Our PhD student Isaura Peddis had her paper on Aristotle and the emotions accepted for presentation at a conference in Edinburgh in July 2015, organised by the European Philosophical Society for the Study of the Emotions. 

The paper is entitled: "Aristotle and his archetypal classical cognitive theory of emotions: a philosophical myth".

Conference - New Directions in Public Reason

Dates: 16th – 17th June 2014

Contact: Jeremy Williams (j.s.williams@bham.ac.uk)


Location: Edgbaston Room, Lucas House, University of Birmingham (G16 on this campus map)


Homepage: www.birmingham.ac.uk/newdirections


Participants: 

Clare Chambers (Cambridge)
Gerald Gaus (Arizona)
Andrew Lister (Queen’s)
Stephen Macedo (Princeton)
Fabienne Peter (Warwick)
Thomas Sinclair (Oxford)
Kevin Vallier (Bowling Green)
Steven Wall (Arizona)


Recent years have seen a flourishing of the philosophical literature on public reason, with a number of new models of public reason being developed, novel arguments in favour of existing models being advanced, and exploration taking place into the implications of the use of public reason for a range of pressing political controversies. At the same time, critics of public reason liberalism have been deploying new objections, and refining familiar ones.

This two-day conference, hosted by Birmingham’s Department of Philosophy, aims to address new and emerging themes in the political philosophy of public reason, and features contributions from proponents of a range of key perspectives from the contemporary debate.

Programme

Monday 16 June:

10.30 – 12.00: Macedo (‘The Practical Uses of Public Reason in a Diverse Democracy’)

12.00 – 13.00: Lunch

13.00 – 14.30: Vallier (‘Public Reason and Public Choice: A Synthesis’)

14.30 – 14.45: Coffee

14.45 – 16.15: Peter (‘From Objective Reason to Public Reason’)

16.15 – 16.30: Coffee

16.30 – 18.00: Wall (‘Razian Authority and Public Reason’)

18.00: Drinks

19.30: Conference dinner


Tuesday 17 June:

10.30 – 12.00: Lister (‘Toleration, Public Reason, and Community’)

12.00 – 13.00: Lunch

13.00 – 14.30: Sinclair (‘International Public Reason’)

14.30 – 14.45: Coffee

14.45 – 16.15: Chambers (‘Political Liberal Neutrality, Public Reason, and State-Recognised Marriage’)

16.15 – 16.30: Coffee

16.30 – 18.00: Gaus (‘Is Public Reason a Normalization Project?: Deep Diversity and the Open Society’)

18.00 End of conference


This event is generously supported by the Leverhulme Trust, the Mind Association, the College of Arts and Law at Birmingham, and the Birmingham University Academic Collaboration Fund (North America).


Registration:

All are welcome, but space is limited, and registration is required. Registration fees have been kept to a minimum, and are £10 for a single day, or £20 for the whole event, including lunch and coffee. To register, please email j.s.williams@bham.ac.uk